VZCZCXRO2693 OO RUEHBI DE RUEHLM #0659 1911035 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 091035Z JUL 08 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8390 INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1000 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7989 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 6161 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4482 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2161 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 4445 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3546 RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 8595 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 6040 RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0707 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2859 RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000659

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE

SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FONSEKA MOVES GOALPOSTS ON VICTORY AGAIN

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).

- 11. (U) In a June 30 interview widely reported in the Sri Lankan press, Army Chief Sarath Fonseka estimated LTTE strength at 5,000 cadres and stated "maybe a maximum of a year from now the LTTE should lose large areas." He also said "Even if we finish the war, capture the whole of the north, still the LTTE might have some members joining them...The LTTE might survive another two decades with over 1,000 cadres...it might continue as an insurgency forever."
- 12. (U) Fonseka has made a habit of predicting that victory is just around the corner. In a Sunday Observer interview in December 2007 he stated the LTTE had 3,000 cadres and would be "wiped out" within six months. This estimate of the Tigers' strength followed a May 2007 assertion that 4,000 Tigers remained and that if they lost 2,000 cadres they would be finished. By the December interview the military figures had put LTTE fighters killed at over 2500 yet the overall fighting strength had only been reduced by 1000.
- 13. (C) COMMENT: Fonseka's term as Army Commander will end December 6th and he is widely believed to be angling to continue on with a new appointment. The President's political popularity is partly dependent on Fonseka and the Army delivering progress against the LTTE. Fonseka's shifting of the goal posts on when victory can be expected may be a conscious attempt to manage public expectations, to give himself cover for not winning the war sooner, secure re-appointment and allow the President to maintain his strong political position. The shifting figures on LTTE personnel illustrate the difficulty in measuring success in a war of attrition, in which the LTTE seek to conceal their actual losses by recovering the bodies of their dead and wounded and by transmitting misleading casualty figures that they know the GSL monitors. Even as the military seeks to control more territory the overall political strategy has not likely significantly affected the LTTE's ability to recruit, train and deploy new fighters to replace those killed in the fighting. Fonseka's comment about the possibility that the insurgency could continue "forever" is different in tone than previous statements. It mirrors Post's comments to the government that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict. Nothing in the GSL's approach to the conflict at this point however, reflects the sort of

counter-insurgency thinking that views the local population as the center of gravity and employs a predominantly political strategy that seeks to address core grievances of the populations, with military forces in a supporting role. The interview could be the first hint of the GSL attempting to prepare the public for an outcome well short of total victory over the LTTE. End Comment BLAKE